The Missile Model
The 1960's was a very interesting time for U.S. pilots and fighter aircraft. Prior to the Vietnam War there was very little for the U.S. to base it's projection for how a then modern air war would be fought. The assumption at the time was that missile technology would make close range dog-fighting (combat between jet fighters at a very close range that involved lots of maneuvering, strategy, and skill) obsolete. This assumption formed the basis of the U.S. Air Force's and Navy's mental models going into the Vietnam War. All U.S. advanced fighter aircraft designed during the early-mid 1960's adhered to this mental model.
Acceptance of this mental model meant that there would be no reason to arm aircraft with guns, weapons which had no guidance and were only useful in dog-fighting. The type of guns mounted on aircraft are very heavy and bulky, which meant that removing them would make aircraft faster and capable of carrying more missiles. A prime example is the F-4 Phantom below. (Image is public domain, free for public and personal use via www.wikipedia.com)
The Vietnam War proved to be a reality check for anyone that thought guns were obsolete, let alone the idea that all combat would take place beyond visual range. A complex mixture of missile malfunctions and new rules of engagement that required U.S. pilots to confirm the ID of enemy planes visually before firing led to numerous dog-fights during the Vietnam War. These dog-fights did not go well for U.S. pilots, which culminated in a 3 to 1 kill to death ratio in air to air combat by the war's end, down from an impressive 15 to 1 ratio during World War II. However, as the war progressed the U.S. adapted, albeit slowly. When the war was over, most pilots sent to Vietnam were taught, at the very least, rudimentary dog-fighting skills and were flying aircraft that, even if they lacked internal guns, were armed with external gun pods.
Causal Loop Diagram
U.S. planners placed little emphasis on the dog-fighting ability of either U.S. pilots or their aircraft prior to the Vietnam War. This is represented by the inner most feed back loop titled "Future Air to Air Combat Will Only Take Place Beyond Visual Range". This scenario represents a situation where military planners were seeking to improve the overall combat effectiveness of U.S. fighter aircraft. The mental model of these planners only considered the ability to strike aircraft at long range and number of missiles such aircraft could carry. When aircraft were considered ineffective, the solution was to increase the number and quality of the aircraft's missile armament, as well as a host of other characteristics related to interceptor class fighters that I am ignoring for reasons of simplicity!
The first unintended feedback loop entitled "Look Ma, No Guns!" is the unintended consequences of designing aircraft solely for long range air to air combat. When the ratio of missile to guns increased the number and quality of guns equipped on aircraft decreased. When the guns were removed the short range effectiveness of fighter aircraft was diminished, represented in the CLD by a decrease in the overall combat effectiveness of the aircraft. Since the planners were only concerned about long range combat and believed that short range air to air missiles were just as effective as guns there was no expectation that removing the guns would be a problem. The delay in the CLD below represents the period before significant combat in Vietnam had taken place. Prior to actual combat, simulated combat between U.S. aircraft reinforced the idea that guns were obsolete.
The second unintended feedback "Top Gun What? Who Needs School, Just Push the Button!" represents the effect on pilots that the mental model of military planners had prior to the Vietnam War. Dependence on missile technology made pilots and instructors lazy with respect to their dog fighting ability. Air to air combat was not practiced like it had been a decade earlier, leaving most pilots with little or no dog-fight training or experience. Unfortunately for U.S. pilots, even the close range air to air missiles were not as effective in combat as planners had hoped, in multiple cases failing to even fire. Even if the missile did fire, these missiles required a very large heat signature to lock on to the target. This meant that U.S. pilots needed to maneuver very skillfully in behind enemy aircraft, aircraft that were often more maneuverable than their U.S. counterparts. This was a difficult task for most pilots who had never experienced more than a casual dog-fight between friends, let alone alone any real air to air training. This is represented in the CLD beginning with an increase in long range effectiveness at the expense of gun related armament. As long range effectiveness goes up, so to does a pilots reliance on guided missiles. The more pilots were taught to rely on guided missiles the less air to air combat was taught, ultimately leading to a decrease in the overall combat effectiveness of the pilot and plane. The delay in this loop represents the slow out-phasing of dog-fighting tactics and the loss of active duty pilots with combat experience, experience that dated back to the Korean War which ended in 1953.
